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By DAVID FRIDAY
University of Michigan
IF we may judge by the utterances-~ of business men and of the press,
the great mass of the American public
believes that the excess profits tax has
been largely responsible for the present
high level of prices. Most of those
who have spoken or written to this
effect have thought it unnecessary to
present proof in support of this con-
clusion ; nor have they gone to the
trouble to examine in detail the logic
of the supposed causal connection.
The report of the New York Chamber
of Commerce states that &dquo;the effect of
excess profits taxes on business enter-
prises and on the high cost of living
is so evident as to require little ex-
planation.&dquo; May it not be possible
that here, as in so many other
instances in the history of politi-
cal economy, the co-existence of two
phenomena in time may have led to
an erroneous conclusion with respect
to their causal relations? The excess
profits tax will no doubt be abandoned
before the presidential election next
fall. Its repeal will be conditioned
upon considerations other than its
effect upon prices, but it is incumbent
upon the economist to examine criti-
cally the assertion that our first dif-
ferential tax upon profits raised the
price level by an amount greater than
the tax.
The discussion of this question has
proceeded with little reference to the
facts concerning prices, profits, or
taxes. These facts seem to the writer
of such an unusual nature and so essen-
tial even in a theoretical discussion of
of the subject that he has decided to
adopt the method employed by Sir
William Petty in his Political Arith-
metic. &dquo;The method I take to do
this,&dquo; said Sir William, &dquo;is not very
usual; for instead of using only com-
parative and superlative words, I
have taken the course to express my-
self in terms of number, weight or
measure; to use only arguments of
sense, and to consider only such causes
as have visible foundations in nature.&dquo;
EFFECT OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX ON
THE RISING PRICE LEVEL
To one acquainted with the course
of prices, profits and taxes, there are
disturbing facts which do not har-
monize easily, to say the least, with
this glib theory which finds in the
excess profits tax the chief cause of
the rising price level. The price level
did not wait for the advent of the
excess profits tax in America. It
started its ascent in July, 1915 and
continued it blithely until in March,
1917, the month previous to our en-
trance into the war, it stood at 160
per cent of the 1913 level. It con-
tinued its rise until July, 1917; at
that time it stood at 185. No excess
profits tax law had yet been passed.
The first law was passed in October,
1917, but no material rise in price
occurred for some months thereafter.
Under this first excess profits tax
law the combined corporations of the
United States paid 15.27 per cent of
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their reported net income in excess
profits tax. After doing so, they had
remaining net income equal to 210 per
cent of the highest amount which they
had earned in any pre-war year. For
the year 1918 the excess profits rates
were increased to the point where they
absorbed approximately 25 per cent
of the profits of that year. In 1919
the rates were materially reduced. As
against $~,400,000,000 of taxes in
1918 they yielded only one-half that
amount in 1919. Prices in 1918
averaged 197 as against 175 in 1917
and 160 in the month previous to our
entering the war. Despite the reduc-
tion of the tax in 1919 prices stood at
238 in December of that year. What
we have, then, is a rise of 60 per cent
in the price level before any excess
profits tax was either levied or dis-
cussed, and a further rise of 27 points
before the tax was passed. Then a
comparatively slight rise in prices
during the period of our highest excess
profits taxes, and a renewed and rapid
rise when the amount of the tax was
cut in half. If one were satirically
inclined, he might affect to look with
apprehension upon a further reduc-
tion in the excess profits tax. This
brief review of the course of prices and
of taxes certainly casts serious doubt
upon the assertion that &dquo;the effect of
excess profits taxes on business enter-
prises and on the high cost of living is
so evident as to require little explana-
tion.&dquo;
Nor does a study of the course of
profits lend any support to the state-
ment, that &dquo;for every $6.00 or $7.00
taken from the consumer, ostensibly
for excess profits tax, only $1.00 ever
reaches the United States Treasury.&dquo;
It would follow from this that profits
had increased, not merely by the
amount of the tax, but that they had
far outrun the amount collected by the
government. But this is not what
the statistics of profits disclose. They










The figures for the years 1918 and
1919 are based upon estimates so care-
fully made that the final published
figures will be but slightly different.
After paying excess profits taxes the
amount of net income remaining from




It is not true, therefore, that profits
have increased since the imposition of
the excess profits tax. Nineteen hun-
dred and seventeen was the highwater
mark of profits, and the tax was not
imposed until the year had almost
closed. After paying taxes the profits
of 1918 and 1919. are far less than they
were in 1916.
All of this reasoning concerning the
effect of excess profits taxes upon
prices rests upon one of two assump-
tions. Either it assumes that the
state of demand during the last three
years has been such that the public
has been willing to pay practically
any price and that sellers would not
have charged high prices except under
the necessities imposed upon them by
the tax. This assumption certainly
needs proving. It is not the sort of
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thing which can be accepted as a mat-
ter of course. The alternative assump-
tion is that the profits of industry are
such a small return upon the capital
that the addition of a tax made it no
longer worth while for the entrepreneur
to remain in production. Therefore,
unless the tax can be added to price,
production is decreased and price rises
in consequence. Now the figures al-
ready presented show that the profits
of 1916 were already twice as high as
those of any pre-war year, while those
of 1917 were two and a half times as
high. The following table shows that
the tax fell heaviest upon industries
like manufacturing, mining and trade.
These are the industries which had
profited most by the war.
shows the net income for 30,892 cor-
porations classified by industries and
grouped according to the percentage
which the corporations earned upon
their invested capital. This table
might well serve as a warning to those
who desire the abolition of the excess
profits tax. They were wise to con-
fine themselves to &dquo;comparative and
superlative words, instead of citing
facts.&dquo; For if the public is given these
facts, fully and honestly, it will prob-
ably be impossible to abolish the tax.
RELATIVE POSITION OF SUPPLY AND
DEMAND
Those who believe that all these
movements in the price level were
caused by the excess profits tax ascribe
TABLE I
Net Income and Excess Profits Taxes of all Corporations in the United States Pre-war and in 1916 and
1917 (Expressed in Millions)
The actual percentage which various
corporations earned upon their in-
vested capital in 1917 is illuminating
in this connection. It is also signifi-
cant as throwing light upon the validity
of our assumptions concerning the
normal rate of profit. The next table
has been prepared from the Senate
Document entitled &dquo; Corporate Earn-
ings and Government Revenues.&dquo; It
to that fiscal measure remarkable
powers of levitation, for according to
their analysis it produced an increase
in price even when the tax was falling
Where the forces are so many and so
complex as are those which lie at the
foundation of the price level it is im-
possible to make convincing statistical
proof of causal relations. We must
supplement our investigation of facts,
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therefore, with a priori analysis. Here
the economist’s analysis of the forces
which control price lends little color.
to the proposition that a differential
tax on business profits will affect price.
No doubt it still holds true that supply
and demand are the only doors through
which the effective causes of change
can reach prices. We may safely
assume, too, that the marginal pro-
high point only under the stimulus of
excess profits taxation.
THE MARGINAL PRODUCER
The tax can be added to price only
if it falls on the marginal producer.
But the marginal producer, if he be
the one who is operating at the least
profit, or at any profit not greater than
8 per cent, pays no tax. If he be a
TABLE II
Net Income of 30,892 Corporations in 1917
ducer will have an effect upon price,
especially if he is tax free and if he
contributes a substantial portion of
the supply. Now with respect to the
relative position of supply and demand,
the situation during the last three
years has probably been one in which
the supply of goods could be but little
increased. Further, the visible supply
is far short of the demand at pre-war
prices or even at the prices which pre-
vailed when the excess profits tax was
first imposed. The condition was one,
therefore, in which it was possible to
sell goods for a price largely in excess
of cost and so at a profit above normal.
In such a situation prices rose. But
surely it is a bit bold and unwarranted
to assume that prices will rise to this
producer who was making more than
8 per cent and demands that larger
amount because of opportunity cost,
there is no escape for him by shifting
to another industry, since he will be
obliged to pay the excess profits tax
in any other industry in which he
may engage. It would seem pretty
clear, then, that short of actual with-
drawal from productive enterprise,
the tax is not one which will affect
supply in such manner as to increase
price.
It is of course conceivable that the
marginal producer may be of so little
significance that his withdrawal from
the field of production would not
cause a material curtailment of supply,
and that his presence does not affect
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competition sufficiently to influence
prices and prevent their rise.
NON-TAX-PAYING PRODUCERS
On the number and importance of
non-tax-paying producers, we have,
fortunately, some statistics. Nine-
teen hundred and eighteen was the
year of the highest excess profits tax
rates. A sample of 6,712 corporations
shows that 3,064 of that number paid
no excess profits tax whatever. These
represented almost exactly one-third
of the total invested capital of this
group of corporations. They earned,
on the average, 5.~ per cent. During
the pre-war period, their capital was
over 38 per cent of the total of this
group, and they earned 7.4 per cent
on their invested capital. It is very
difficult to believe that these estab-
lishments representing 45 per cent of
the total number and one-third of the
total capital exercised no influence in
competitive price making.
When we examine the remaining
3,648 corporations we find that 1,497
paid tax under the 30 per cent bracket,
and that their total tax amounted to
only 7.66 per cent of their net income.
This group, together with those that
paid no taxes, had over 60 per cent of
the invested capital of these 6,712
corporations. Certainly their freedom
from excess profits taxes should have
given us abundant guarantee against
the shifting of this tax.
But, as Hobson long since pointed
out, it may be that neither of these
groups is marginal, that the marginal
man is found among those who made
extraordinary profits. These are the
men who have great resourcefulness
and initiative and can easily shift to
new fields. But shifting avails them
nothing, as the excess profits tax ap-
plies to all fields of industry.
But one possibility still remains.
May they not agree with the father of
Huckleberry Finn. When the elder
Finn was just entering upon the early
stages of delirium tremens, he summed
up his attitude toward our political
institutions in general in the trenchant
conclusion that &dquo; this is a hell of a
government.&dquo; May they not, simi-
larly minded, withdraw from industry
altogether, and from their citadel of .
past profits, accumulated in the days
when there were no excess profits
taxes, observe what the Wall Street
Journal calls the &dquo;vampire-like&dquo; activ-
ities of the government.
TAXES ON EXCESS AND WAR PROFITS
The rate of profits which was suf-
ficient to induce them to remain in
business during the pre-war period
would seem to be the best evidence on
this point. Of the 6,712 corporations
whose incomes were cited for 1918,
2,151 corporations paid practically all
of the $1~1,039,9~3 of taxes of this
group, 1,497 paid $7,412,123 and
3,064 paid no taxes. During the pre-
war period these 2,151 major tax-
payers had earned $89,~98,9~5 on
an invested capital of $603,000,000.
Evidently 15 per cent was sufficient
to keep them in production during
these pre-war years. During 1918
they earned a net income of $281,775,-
190 on an invested capital of $1,060,-
000,000 or 26.6 per cent on their in-
vested capital before taxes. Of this the
government took 43 per cent, leaving
them approximately 15.2 per cent free
and clear on an amount of capital 40
per cent larger. This additional capi-
tal largely represented war profits of
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the years preceding 1918. These cor-
porations would hardly be moved to
withdraw from industry altogether by
the workings of the excess profits tax.
But these taxes include not only
those upon excess profits, but the war
taxes as well. Since the war profits
taxes were levied for only a single
year and do not apply to the profits of
1919 or subsequent years, we must
know the size of the excess profits tax
alone and the ratio of that tax to capi-
tal. This amounted to $88,309,393
for the ~,151 corporations, and con-
stituted 31.3 per cent of the net in-
come of these corporations, leaving
them 18.2 per cent on their invested
capital after paying taxes, as against
15 per cent in the pre-war period.
Under the rates in force in 1919 these
corporations would have paid less
than $58,000,000, and would have
remaining over 21 per cent on their
invested capital.
Which of these groups of corpora-
tions, then, actually curtailed supply,
or even threatened to do so, in such
manner as to produce the rise in price?
In other words, who shifted whose
taxes? In the absence of monopoly
it is extremely difficult to believe that
any of them curtailed their supply.
The buyer was placed at the mercy of
the seller, not by the excess profits tax,
but by the fact that the general supply
of commodities had reached its maxi-
mum. There is absolutely nothing to
prove that buyers would not have
been just as completely at the seller’s
mercy if there had been no excess
profits tax. Nor is there anything to
prove that the seller would not have
pursued his advantage as vigorously.




But what of monopoly? It is a
well-known principle of price that
prices of goods marketed under monop-
olistic conditions are fixed at the
point where they will yield the highest
net profit. It avails the monopolist
nothing, therefore, to raise his price
when he is confronted with an income
tax. Any change in price will lower
his tax, it is true, but it does so only by
lowering his income. The amount
that remains after payment of taxes
will be less at the new price than at the
former one. Of course, if a monopoly
puts itself upon a fixed profit per unit,
as some automobile manufacturers are
said to do, then it may be that the
imposition of an excess profits tax will
produce an increase in price. But
this is only because the monopolist
had not pushed his advantage to its
logical conclusion before.
In cases of monopolistic enterprises
or of other enterprises which are mak-
ing high percentage of profit, the work-
ing of the excess profits tax actually
tends to stimulate the investment of
new capital in the old enterprise and
thus to increase the supply and lower
the price of the product. Moreover,
this is the more true as the maximum
rates of taxation are increased. For
the additional invested capital will
add to the ultimate net income avail-
able for distribution, not only the
amount which is earned from the sale
of the additional product, say 5 per
cent, but it will increase the exemption
by 8 per cent of the invested capital
and so reduce the amount which is sub-
ject to the highest rates. Thus, if a
company on an invested capital of
$10,000,000 makes a net income of,
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$~,500,000 (or 25 per cent) its excess
profits taxes under the 1919 rates
would be $439,400 and its net income
after taxes $~,060,600. Now assume
that the investment of $2,000,000 of
additional capital will increase its net
income by $100,000 or 5 per cent on
its additional capital. This return
would probably not be sufficient in-
ducement for the investment. But
an excess profits tax at even the low
rates of 20 and 40 per cent which pre-
vailed in 1919 will now be only $367,-
400 on the net income of $2,600,000,
leaving $~,~3~,600 after payment of
taxes. If we compare this amount
with the amount remaining originally,
we find that the net income left to the
corporation has increased by $172,000,
or 8.6 per cent on the additional in-
vested capital of $2,000,000. This
would probably be a sufficient induce-
ment for the new money, as it is well
above the going rate of interest. This
effect of additional invested capital
has been recognized by those who have
advised corporations in excess profits
tax matters, and has been noted by
J. C. Stamp in a recent article in the
Economic Journal.
EXCESS PROFITS TAX NOT CAUSE OF
INCREASED PRICES
Neither the statistical facts nor
the implications of economic law sup-
port the conclusion that the excess
profits tax has been responsible for
the increase in price which we have
witnessed during the last five years.
The most that can be said for it is that
the tax may have given some seller the
courage to move his price up a little
earlier, or a little farther, than he would
otherwise have done. But not even
this much can be conceded for the
rise of 60 points which occurred be-
tween July, 1915, and March, 1917.
Change of Institutions and Attitude
To trace the effect of the complex
and tangled causes that have pro-
duced the present price situation is a
long and arduous task. In the writer’s
opinion any such explanation must
take as its point of departure the com-
plete revaluation of ends which took
place in the European mind when the
nations went to war. It must con-
clude with an. analysis of the present
inefficiency of labor, a factor which
increases the cost of the labor element
in production far more than is indi-
cated by the mere rise of wage scales
per hour or per day. Between the
beginning and the end of the war a
whole series of institutions and of
human attitudes has been wrecked.
The gold standard, conservative bank-
ing policy, a private economy which
set store by a constant power to de-
mand the things needed for a custom-
ary class standard of living, our mental
attitude toward national indebtedness,
our conception of what constitutes an
honest day’s work for an honest day’s
pay; every one of these phrases stood
at the beginning of the European war
for a definite part of the institutional
situation within the confines of which
the industrial life of the people moved.
Every one of these institutions has
been radically changed. In the story
of that change lies the explanation for
our new price level.
